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Abstract 
Economic games in field settings have been subject to criticism concerning their ecological 
validity.  We use social identity theory and the intergroup contact hypothesis as a framework to 
illustrate how economic games can be applied to field settings with higher ecological validity. A 
quasi-experiment in two rural Cameroonian villages studied participants’ allocation of rice to co-
inhabitants of their village. The villages are characterized by different degrees of contact 
between the ethnic groups and the sexes. Our results indicate that women who are segregated 
from each other disadvantage other women more than men, or women who experience higher 
amounts of contact. These findings are interesting from a theoretical and methodological 
perspective since we utilized a non-monetary stake in naturalistic intergroup settings.  
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Intergroup contact and rice allocation via a modified dictator game in rural Cameroon 
Experimental economic games have been played with Sukuma and Pimbwe people in 
Tanzania (Paciotti & Hadley, 2003), with Hadza in Tanzania (Marlowe, 2004), Torguud and 
Kazakh in the Republic of Mongolia (Gil-White, 2004) and with the inhabitants of villages in the 
Commonwealth of Dominica (Macfarlan, 2011). Such games are useful for measuring aspects of 
social norms and preferences. By allowing reciprocity, inequality aversion and altruism to 
become visible in a quantifiable manner, economic games have become increasingly important 
in anthropology since the mid-1990s (cf. Chibnik, 2005; Camerer & Fehr, 2004).   
This study uses the Dictator Game, which consists of a ‘one person decision task’: The 
players (dictators) individually distribute a stake between themselves and their recipient. The 
recipient cannot object to the dictator’s allocation; the resources are split according to the 
dictator’s wishes. Since the dictator does not have to fear repercussions from the recipient, the 
Dictator Game is usually seen as providing a pure measure of altruism (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). 
In the classic Dictator Game the dictators and the recipients do not know each other’s identity; it 
is seen as a crucial characteristic of the game that the players remain anonymous (cf. Henrich, 
Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis & McElreath, 2001).  
Self-interest suggests that the dictator keeps the entire stake and gives nothing to the recipient. 
However, many studies obtained different results (see Bolton, Katok & Zwick, 1998; Henrich et 
al., 2001). Bolton et al. (1998) suggest that allocations arise from concerns for fair distribution 
on the part of dictators. These fairness concerns originate from personal and social rules that 
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impact on self-interested behavior. However, when dictators distribute a gift among multiple 
recipients, individual dictators show little tendency towards fairness (Bolton et al., 1998).  
A possible explanation comes from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social 
identities are based on an individual’s membership in relevant social groups. The groups a 
person identifies with are ingroups and can include one’s nationality, religion, gender and 
ethnicity. In contrast, outgroups are groups other than one’s own; individuals tend to distinguish 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ with important attitudinal and behavioral consequences (see Brehm, 
Kassin & Fein, 2005).  
Even if the distinction between in- and outgroup is based on minimal and irrelevant criteria, 
individuals tend to favor ingroup over outgroup members (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 
1971). Using a student sample, Ben-Ner, McCall, Stephane and Wang (2009) demonstrated clear 
ingroup-favoritism in imaginary and real Dictator Game giving. Unfortunately, only their second 
study involved allocating an actual monetary stake. Goette, Huffmann and Meier (2010) 
compared the impact of random assignment to minimal versus real groups on the allocation of a 
monetary stake in Swiss army officer candidate trainees. While both types of group membership 
lead to ingroup favoritism, ingroup favoritism was stronger for army recruits who had been 
allocated to real social groups as compared to minimal groups. Ruffle and Sosis (2006) 
conducted an experiment among Israeli Kibbutzim and city residents. Kibbutzim showed clear 
ingroup favoritism and there were no significant differences between Kibbutzims’ and city 
residents’ allocations of a monetary resource in a cooperative, simultaneous game. 
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Gil-White (2004) investigated whether players favored ingroup over outgroup members in an 
Ultimatum Game. Contrary to the findings above, the players favored the ethnic outgroup. Yet, it 
is important to note that Ultimatum Games allow repercussions from the recipient which is not 
true for Dictator Games. Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) showed that ingroup favoritism can be 
overridden by reciprocity expectations. While in a simultaneous game – i.e. not allowing for 
reciprocity – participants favored members of their own group; in a supposedly sequential game 
– allowing for reciprocity – this ingroup favoritism disappeared. 
Enabling interactions between the members of rival groups can reduce discrimination (e.g., 
Allport, 1954, Cook, 1978). Allport (1954) concluded that people who live together with 
outgroup members are friendlier, less fearful and stereotype less than people living in segregated 
areas. Communication and joint community enterprises are important to create conditions under 
which friendly contacts and correct social perceptions can develop.  
The current research 
Economic games sometimes lack external and ecological validity (e.g. Benz & Meier, 2008; 
Levitt & List, 2007). Gurven and Winking (2008) argue that the anonymity requirement and the 
artificial setting undermine the links between findings obtained in non-laboratory research. Thus, 
our decisions to relax the anonymity condition and to use non-monetary resources for allocation 
may enhance ecological validity (cf. Alvard, 2004; Gurven & Winking, 2008; Henrich et al., 
2001). One alteration to the commonly used game protocol is the use of rice as stake in this study 
(see also Alvard, 2004).  
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There are several reasons why we chose rice as stake: In Cameroon 48% of the population 
live below the poverty line (CIA, 2012), with most of the poor being in the rural areas such as 
the villages we have studied. We found it ethically problematic to introduce monetary stakes to a 
research sample in these poor communities. Another practical obstacle was the lack of small 
change. It was difficult to consistently change bank notes to coins. We used rice since it was 
easily available, valued and easy to share. 
The second procedural alteration was the removal of recipient anonymity. The easiest and 
most natural way to make group membership salient was to name the recipient. We felt that it 
would be artificial, and risk biasing the results to refer to recipients by their group memberships 
only.  
The intergroup contact hypothesis (e.g. Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) was designed to 
overcome racial prejudice and discrimination. Intergroup contact can challenge intergroup 
discrimination if members of the different groups have the opportunity to engage in positive 
contact. Our study tests this assumption in two different field sites in the Nigeria-Cameroon 
borderland, which differ in relative frequency of contact between the sexes and the cohabiting 
ethnic groups. We investigated whether a) dictators distinguish between different recipients 
based on the recipients’ group membership (ethnicity, sex) and whether b) the allocation of rice 
is different for the two villages. This question is particularly interesting with reference to c) 
female rice allocation, since there is more contact between the women of Somié than between the 
women of Oumyari. 
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Study Sites 
Oumyari 
Oumyari is located in the Adamawa Region of Cameroon, close to the Nigerian border. The 
closest administrative center is the town Banyo, approximately 15km away. The population of 
Oumyari comprises mainly of peasant farmers, who grow maize and manioc principally for 
subsidence but also as cash crops. Approximately 500 inhabitants live in the village, which is 
made up of thirteen hamlets. The two main ethnic groups in Oumyari are the Wawa and the 
Fulbe. Wawa people live in eleven of the hamlets. The remaining two hamlets are exclusively 
populated by Fulbe people. The Wawa hamlets from which participants were chosen are 
exclusively populated by Wawa. The names of Fulbe outgroup recipients were chosen from 
people living in the two Fulbe-only hamlets. The Dictator Game in Oumyari was run by Thomae 
and Griffiths together with local assistants.  
Fulbe and Wawa have a difficult past. The Wawa are part of the original population of the 
area, which was invaded by the Fulbe approximately 150 years ago. The Wawa subsequently 
acceded to Fulbe dominance (see Gausset, 1999). All of the Fulbe and mixed population hamlets 
are located on the northern side of the small river that runs through Oumyari while most of the 
Wawa hamlets are located on the southern side. The Fulbe are regarded as foreigners and 
strangers by the older Wawa. On most days Wawa and Fulbe do not interact. Their hamlets and 
surrounding forest areas are separate from each other. However, on Fridays men (and a few 
women) from all hamlets come to the central Wawa hamlet to take a lorry to the market in 
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Banyo.   
For both Wawa and Fulbe there is strong gender segregation. A tradition for young men in 
Oumyari includes building a house. They then construct a second house and a kitchen for a 
potential wife on the same piece of land and finally built a fence around this compound once a 
marriage has been agreed upon. To a great extent women's lives are lived within these 
compounds. Women need a reason such as fetching water or going to the fields if they want to 
leave their compound. Women visit each other within compounds but do not socialize outside 
them. Contrastingly, men's lives are lived both within and beyond the compounds. Men meet in 
the mosque, in the streets, the hamlets’ centers and on the numerous football fields of the village. 
Both men and women work in the fields; however, usually they work them at different times or 
in separate locations. Apart from these duties women require their husband's permission to leave 
their compound. Men decide freely about their own activities. For more detailed information on 
the historical context between the Wawa and the Fulbe, please refer to Gausset (1998; 1999). 
Somié 
Somié village is also located in the Adamawa Region, approximately 90km away from 
Bankim, its administrative center, to the South of Banyo. The population is mainly comprised of 
peasant farmers, who are self-sufficient in staple crops growing maize, ground nuts and coffee as 
cash crops. The village population has grown from approximately 2000 inhabitants in 1986 to 
approximately 5000 inhabitants today. The village center where the game was played has a 
population of approximately 2000 inhabitants and is inhabited by Cameroonian Mambila with a 
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large number of Nigerian Mambila who immigrated over the last 20 years, as well as a number 
of Fulbe and other ethnicities. The local assistant who ran the Dictator Game in Somié is a 
Mambila male, approximately 45 years of age who has worked for Zeitlyn on many occasions 
conducting village censuses and mapping exercises. 
In 1985 Somié was almost exclusively Mambila. The main change since then is that large 
numbers of Nigerian Mambila moved in and built houses adjacent to the village, thereby 
expanding it. Although Cameroonian Mambila are mainly Christian with a sizeable minority of 
Muslims, Nigerian Mambila are almost exclusively Muslim. When Fulbe arrive they tend to live 
with or near their co-religionists. Until approximately 1995 Fulbe came for dry season 
transhumance only. Since then some have been staying throughout the year and a few families 
have settled permanently. There are no hamlets which are ethnically homogenous. Some Fulbe 
live in outlying hamlets, others in the village center. 
Women tend to live separate lives from men, giving them autonomy. However, on market 
days and on Sundays, there is mixed social activity revolving around the drinking of local maize 
beer and the meetings of revolving credit associations (see Ardener, 1964; Zeitlyn, 2003). Most 
revolving credit associations are mixed.  About two thirds of the village inhabitants are 
Christians and services and related activities are mixed. Some Mambila women have married 
Fulbe men and subsequently converted to Islam, coming to lead more sheltered lives in the 
process. However, these women still farm and go to market. Zeitlyn is not aware of any Fulbe 
women who have married Mambila men. Both sexes are involved in farming but they do so 
separately. Women’s tasks involve cooking and childcare. Men’s tasks include building houses. 
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Both sexes fish. Generally, and in contrast to Oumyari, women in Somié can move freely e.g. 
going to the market or visiting friends. More information about the social structure of Somie may 
be found in Zeitlyn, Mial and Mbe (2000) and Zeitlyn (1994). 
Food sharing norms  
Rice in the villages is an expensive crop and many families reserve it for special 
occasions. On a daily basis, the villagers’ diet is based on other crops, particularly manioc and 
sweet potatoes. Rice consumption is similar to the consumption of meat. Nevertheless, rice is 
usually available from village shops. 
Neither village has norms to share raw or uncooked food such as the rice in the 
experiment. However, there is a sharing norm for cooked food: if someone visits when people 
are eating then there is a very strong injunction to offer them food and it is very impolite for a 
visitor to refuse to eat. Visitors usually have a small taster so as to not imply suspicion that the 
offered food is poisoned. In both villages the offer of cooked food by the hosts serves to disprove 
witchcraft by assuring the visitor (who accepts this by eating) that no ‘sweet meat’ (i.e. human 
flesh) is eaten (see Zeitlyn, 2003). 
Method 
Participants   
Twenty Wawa men and twenty Wawa women in Oumyari and twenty Mambila men and 
twenty Mambila women in Somié participated as dictators in this experiment. We selected 
participants by asking local teenagers to compile a list of adult women and men in each village. 
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We instructed these children to list names of 30 ingroup and 10 outgroup adults, with equal 
numbers of males and females. Thus, participants were not selected randomly and are not 
representative of the village populations. Any adult villager was eligible for participation.  
While this sampling strategy worked well in Oumyari, the list for Somié resulted in unequal 
numbers in the experimental conditions. Data on age and marital status were not available (see 
Zeitlyn & Bagg, 2000)1. Due to the sampling method it appeared that adults of childbearing age 
were overrepresented. All participants invited to play the game agreed to participate. 
Design 
The ethnic groups of the participants (Wawa, Mambila) were defined as the ingroups and 
in both cases the Fulbe were defined as the outgroup. The ingroup participants allocated rice 
either to an ingroup or to an outgroup member. The study had a 2 (village) x 2 (sex of recipient) 
x 2 (ethnic group of recipient) x 2 (sex of dictator) quasi-experimental design. The participants 
(dictators) were matched with recipients. The dependent variable was the amount of rice 
participants allocated to their respective recipient from a stake of 1 kilogram of rice. We 
measured the quantity of rice using a food scale. 
Procedure  
The game was played in each village over 2 consecutive days to avoid contamination through 
communication among participants. We filled forty plastic bags with 1 kilogram of rice each. 
Since there is no food sharing norm for uncooked food in either village, we used the translation 
of ‘share’ (Mambila ‘kop’, Wawa ‘gɔ̆g’) in our instructions: “Here is 1 kilogram of rice. Please 
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share it, one part is for you, one part for [the recipient].” Neither local word for ‘share’ implies 
halves. 
We visited all allocators at home. All allocators knew their recipients personally but we did 
not observe attempts by the allocators to contact recipients (we did not undertake specific steps 
to mitigate this, deeming it an acceptable risk in the social context). The recipients did not know 
the identity of the allocators. All participants appeared to understand the game instructions and 
we did not ask comprehension questions or conduct post-game interviews. Similar to the 
uncontextualised game in Lesorogol’s (2007) research, the allocators made no reference to any 
particular norm. In general, allocators commented very little on the game and did not explain 
their offering choices.  
We initially intended that participants poured the rice for the recipient into a different plastic 
bag. However, the allocators preferred to pour as much rice as they wanted for themselves into a 
dish and leave the recipient’s share in the original plastic bag. After data collection was 
completed, we weighed each rice bag and recorded the result. Later, we visited all recipients to 
hand them over their rice anonymously.  
Results 
The average amount of rice allocated was 444.00g (SD = 74.00), ranging from 162 grams to 
560 grams. A univariate analysis of variance was used to analyze the impact of village, sex of 
allocator, sex of recipient, ethnic group membership of recipient and all possible interaction 
effects on the amount of rice allocated. A complete table for the ANOVA results can be found as 
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supplementary materials online. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of sex of allocator 
(F(1,64) = 7.98, p = .006, η2 = .11), indicating that men allocated larger amounts of rice (M = 
461.00, SD = 46.56) than women (M = 428.00, SD = 91.42). There was no significant main 
effect of village in the allocation of rice (F(1,64) = .29, p = .590, η2 = .01), indicating that 
allocators in Oumyari (M = 439.00, SD = 72.23, ~ 44%) did not allocate the rice significantly 
differently from allocators in Somié (M = 449.00, SD = 76.33, ~ 45%).  
Village and sex of recipient interacted significantly (F(1,64) = 8.17, p = .006, η2 = .11). A 
planned comparison revealed that women in Oumyari received significantly less rice (M = 
427.00, SD = 76.03) than women in Somié (M = 474.00, SD = 92.85, p = .046). This finding 
supports our hypothesis that participants would be less generous towards women in Oumyari, 
where women are less visible. In contrast, women are better known to other village inhabitants in 
Somié. Figure 1 shows this pattern of results. However, this finding needs to be treated with 
caution since this interaction effect is qualified by a significant three-way interaction effect 
between village, sex of allocator and sex of recipient.  
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Figure 1. The Amount of Rice allocated by Village and Sex of Recipient. 
Village and ethnic group membership of recipient also interacted significantly (F(1,64) = 
14.01, p < .001, η2 = .18). We compared the allocation of rice to the in- versus outgroup in both 
villages using planned comparisons. The Fulbe outgroup in Oumyari received significantly less 
rice (M = 409.50, SD = 77.42) than the Fulbe outgroup in Somié (M = 470.00 SD = 46.11, p = 
.008). This finding supports the hypothesis that in Somié, the outgroup is treated in a more 
altruistic manner. This pattern of results is shown in Figure 2. 
Running head: CONTACT AND RICE ALLOCATION IN CAMEROON      
Published as: 
Thomae, M., Zeitlyn, D., Griffiths, S.S. & Van Vugt, M. (2013). Intergroup contact and the rice allocation via a modified dictator 
game in rural Cameroon. Field Methods, 25 (1), 74-90. doi. 10.1177/1525822X12466981 
 
 
16 
 
Figure 2. The Amount of Rice allocated by Village and Ethnic Group of Recipient 
Moreover, sex of recipient and ethnic group membership of the recipient interacted 
significantly (F(1,64) = 9.72, p = .003, η2 = .13). Further analysis revealed that participants did 
not discriminate between ingroup and outgroup men (ingroup men: M = 425.00, SD = 94.28; 
outgroup men: M = 453.50, SD = 64.95, p = .206) but discriminated between ingroup and 
outgroup women by favoring ingroup women (M = 475.00, SD = 45.23) over outgroup women 
(M = 426.00, SD = 73.69, p = .037). This pattern of rice allocation can be seen in Figure 3. 
Running head: CONTACT AND RICE ALLOCATION IN CAMEROON      
Published as: 
Thomae, M., Zeitlyn, D., Griffiths, S.S. & Van Vugt, M. (2013). Intergroup contact and the rice allocation via a modified dictator 
game in rural Cameroon. Field Methods, 25 (1), 74-90. doi. 10.1177/1525822X12466981 
 
 
17 
 
Figure 3. The Amount of Rice allocated by Sex and Ethnic Group Membership of Recipient. 
Finally, there was a three-way interaction between village, sex of allocator and sex of 
recipient on rice allocation (F(1,64) = 4.92, p = .030, η2 = .07). In line with our hypothesis a 
planned contrast revealed that there was a significant difference between the amount of rice 
allocated by women to women in Oumyari (M = 391.00, SD = 79.10) and the amount of rice 
allocated by women to women in Somié (M = 473.00, SD = 46.71, p = .006). This was not true 
for male-male allocation in the two villages (Oumyari: M = 458.00, SD = 46.86; Somié: M = 
454.00, SD = 47.18, p = .897). All means and standard deviations are available in Table 1.  
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Table 1  
Rice Allocation by Village, Sex of Allocator and Sex of Recipient 
 
 
  
Village 
Oumyari Somié 
Sex of Allocator 
Male Female Male Female 
Sex of Recipient 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
458.00 
(46.86) 
463.00 
(55.39) 
463.00 
(86.31) 
391.00 
(79.10) 
454.00 
(47.18) 
478.00 
(34.17) 
406.00 
(136.12) 
473.00 
(46.71) 
N = 10 N = 10 N = 10 N = 10 N = 14 N = 6 N = 7 N = 13 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to increase ecological validity of the Dictator Game by relaxing the 
anonymity requirement for the dictator and using rice as the stake instead of money. The findings 
supported the hypotheses derived from previous research (Allport, 1954; Bolton et al., 1998; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
In earlier research, women donated significantly more than men to an anonymous partner 
(Eckel & Grossman, 1998).  In our study, men allocated larger amounts of rice than women, 
which may be due to the choice of rice as the stake: Women provide approximately 70% of all 
agricultural labor and produce approximately 90% of the food in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNIFEM, 
2008). In rural Africa, women perform 80% of domestic tasks including preparing and cooking 
meals and processing and storing food. Thus, for women, rice may have more importance than 
for men since they tended to retain larger amounts of the stake. Future research may wish to 
replicate this study in order to clarify the roles of specific stakes in the allocations made by 
dictators.  
In Oumyari, male recipients received more rice than female recipients, while the opposite was 
true in Somié. One explanation is the reduced visibility of women, hence, the reduced contact of 
both sexes with women in Oumyari as compared to Somié. Across all allocators there is a 
preference of ingroup over outgroup women in the allocated amount of rice. Our argument is 
further corroborated by the finding that particularly women in Oumyari discriminate against 
outgroup women, which is not the case in Somié which is more integrated. Yet it is important to 
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acknowledge that there are limitations to our findings. Future research may wish to control for 
confounding variables by ensuring that the included villages have inhabitants of the same 
ingroup, religion, intergroup history and other background variables (see Ensminger, 2004). 
Games aim to elicit ‘pure’ behavior by isolating it from social contexts. However, Lesorogol 
(2007) demonstrated that allocators adhered to a meat-sharing norm in a contextualized but not 
in an uncontextualized game. She argues that the likelihood of normative behavior depends on 
the significance of the norm invoked by the game situation. Similarly, other factors, such as the 
experimenter observing the allocation might induce guilt or shame in the allocator and thus curb 
selfish behavior (e.g. Koch & Normann, 2008). Koch and Normann’s results indicate that 
approximately half of dictator giving is externally motivated. Further research is needed to rule 
out such factors in the explanation of our data. 
Henrich et al. (2005, p. 813) state that ‘extensive market interactions may accustom 
individuals to the idea that strangers can be trusted […].’ Since there was no overall difference in 
rice allocation between the two villages but a difference in the allocation to visible versus less 
visible female villagers, we propose that our findings are based on the amount of interaction 
taking place with village co-inhabitants. Trust is an outcome of social interaction and contact 
(Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger & Niens, 2006). We suggest that the higher involvement in 
market participation by women in Somié (in contrast to Oumyari) may constitute a way of 
encouraging social contact and interaction, thus building trust and reducing discrimination.  
There is evidence that when allocators distribute a stake between multiple recipients, most 
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allocators tend to discriminate between different recipients (Bolton et al., 1998). This article 
attempted to systemize ideas as to why dictators treat multiple recipients unequally. Even though 
there are other important differences such as religious affiliation and the extent and history of the 
relative domination by/independence from the Fulbe between the two villages, we believe that 
the different degrees of contact in these communities may play a vital part in the differential 
treatment of in- and outgroup recipients.  
Finally, we wish to emphasize the importance of theoretically driven tests in anthropological 
settings. We believe that specifically in cases where communities at field sites are composed of 
different ethnic, religious or other groups, the social psychological literature on group processes 
and intergroup relations (e.g. Turner & Crisp, 2010) can make a valuable contribution to 
anthropology. In addition, social psychological research can benefit from its application to novel, 
out-of-laboratory settings. In particular, our study enriches social psychological research by 
applying behavioral measures and, avoiding convenience samples, using a non-student sample in 
a natural setting (see Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010). There are confounding influences in 
such field settings, which may constitute a threat to the theoretical interpretation and validity of 
the findings. However, we think that the application of experimental methodology can make an 
interesting contribution to research in field settings.  
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1 Questions on demographic data are delicate in various village contexts and are usually 
asked only by bureaucrats or medical personnel. If we had attempted to ask them it would have 
changed the exercise from a relatively light hearted game into a far more charged situation, 
prompting suspicion and evasion (typical responses to bureaucrats). In the end we took the view 
that although we could have attempted to collect such information in a separate data collection 
exercise, the difficulty in obtaining reliable data did not justify the additional analytic purchase 
of such data, especially since this is pilot research, seeking to demonstrate that the method can be 
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applied in these sorts of field environment. 
